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1. Introduction1 
Two years ago, at the beginning of November 1991, President Boris Yeltsin 
appointed the new government of the Russian Federation, working under his own 
direct leadership.  A team of young economists, under deputy Prime Minister Egor 
Gaidar, began a process of economic transformation toward a market economy.   
Since that time, events in Russia have been at the center of attention of both 
politicians and economists.  At the same time, there have been many 
misunderstandings and simplified stereotypes surrounding that process.  The one 
most often repeated is that the introduction of the so-called shock therapy in Russia, 
similar to the Balcerowicz plan in Poland, has failed under Russian conditions.  
This misunderstanding results from, it would appear, accepting program intentions of 
some Russian politicians, as well as press commentaries describing, often in a 
simplified and prejudiced manner, the intentions of the new team as reality.  The 
picture of the economic transformation in Russia is, however, in reality much more 
complex, in both program intentions, and in their realization.  From the perspective 
of two years it appears obvious that the Russian transformation contained both, 
certain significant elements of a radical, or even shocking approach, such as the 
liberalization of domestic prices in the beginning of 1992, and the forced program of 
corporatization and privatization of state enterprises begun in the summer of 1992, 
as well as significant set-backs in other areas, such as demonopolization or export 
liberalization. The factor of the reform process which is the weakest and most 
sensitive to political turmoil has turned out to be macroeconomic policy.  The 
Russian authorities have been unsuccessful in preventing high inflation, though 
luckily not as high, for example, as in the Ukraine or Bielorus. 
The goal of this article is the presentation of the general results of the Russian 
economic reforms in the period from November 1991 to November 1992, with 
particular emphasis on macroeconomic policy and the failed attempts at fiscal 
stability.  Such a profile of the article results from the personal interests of the 
author, the specific condition in which Russia found itself after the collapse of the 
USSR (the existence of a rouble zone with a series of independent central banks), as 
well as from the importance of macroeconomic balance (often under appreciated) in 
the success of the process of transformation from a planned to a market economy.  
Furthermore, macroeconomic policy is precisely the factor of the chosen strategy of 
transformation, which most differentiates Russia from the countries of the so-called 
Visegrad group. 
                                       
1  This article was written at the end of November 1993. I have had possibility to observe 
Russian economic developments as the economic consultant to the Government of Russian 
Federation since November 1991. I am very grateful to Sergei Vasilev, Andrei Illarionov, Anders 
Aslund, Jeffrey Sachs, Charles Wyplosz, Brigitte Granville, Jacques Delpla, W³adys³aw Jermakowicz 
and Julian Pañków for helpful exchange of view concerning the economic situation in Russia. I want 
to acknowledge also the role of the staff of the Macroeconomic and Financial Unit of Ministry of 
Finance of Russia (MFU), especially of Brigitte Granville and Torun Hedback, in supplying me with 
necessary statistical data. Michael Cader was the translator of the Polish version into English. 
However, I am solely responsible for the content of this paper and its deficiencies. 
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The article will also leave out a deeper analysis of the political situation, even 
though it has had a significant influence on the course of the reform process. 
The article will focus mainly on the second year of the Russian transformation.  
This is due to the possibility of presenting rather current economic results, as well as 
formulating more advanced conclusions.  Furthermore, the initial program 
assumptions and the course of events in the first year of transformation (1992) have 
been the subject of analysis for a number of studies [Aslund and Layard, 1993; 
Blanchard et al., 1993; D¹browski et al., 1993].  It must however be clearly 
emphasized that it is still too early for formulating definite evaluations of what has 
occurred in Russia in the years 1991-1993.  This will require, as the Polish example 
illustrates, a somewhat longer time span.  An additional complication is the low 
quality of statistical data dealing with Russia.  This is in regards to not only the GDP 
statistics or inflation, which, in light of the experiences of other post-communist 
countries, seems obvious, but also such things as monetary and fiscal statistics.  Due 
to this, the conclusions presented in this article should be treated as introductory, 
and might be corrected as new events unfold and more accurate statistical data can 
be attained. 
The content of the article has been organized as follows: Point 2 presents a 
concise view of the characteristics of the starting point of reform at the end of 1991.  
Point 3 describes the process of the liberalization of the domestic prices and market.  
Point 4 deals with the meanders of the liberalization policy in foreign trade.  Point 5 
presents a synthetic picture of the privatization policy.  Point 6 describes 
macroeconomic policy in 1992, while point 7 - the stabilization efforts of 1993.  In 
point 8 there is a short history of the collapse of the rouble zone.  Point 9 contains 
conclusions and an attempt to forecast future events. 
2.  Starting point. 
The economic situation of the USSR, including that of the Russian Federation in 
the fall of 1991, at the time of the formation of the Yeltsin - Gaidar government, was 
unusually difficult, even dramatic.  The collapse of the communist regime and the 
political break up of the Soviet Union resulted in a gradual erosion of central 
planning, which in the USSR survived the longest and was most resistant to all 
reforms.  The broad attempts of systemic changes, begun in 1987, only accelerated 
the collapse. 
Therefore a situation arose, also typical to other post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the system of central planning was dissolved to a 
point that it could no longer function as a coordinating mechanism at the micro level 
or a disciplinary one at the macro level.  The market mechanism, on the other hand, 
was too weak to take over that function.  Therefore, a systemic vacuum had been 
created - an economy both unplanned and non-market, without the appropriate 
microeconomic motivation and without the possibility of attaining macroeconomic 
balance. 
Soviet enterprises found themselves outside of any microeconomic regime.   
The only directional of their activity became the logic of a deep goods deficit Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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economy.  In addition, a weak government (in the sense that it did not have political 
support among the population, yet was no longer willing to utilize violence and 
repression, as in a classic totalitarian regime or, for example, in contemporary China) 
was willing to gain a transient social calm in return for the emission of inflationary 
money.  This was not only the case in the former USSR between 1989-1991, but also 
in Poland between 1987-1989, Romania after the fall of the dictatorship of Nicolae 
Ceausescu, Bulgaria, and Albania.  Only the former GDR, Hungary, and Czecho-
Slovakia were successful in avoiding macroeconomic chaos during the transition 
period. 
In the past, the money supply in the Soviet economy (similarly to other 
countries with a command economy) was excessive relative to the norms of a 
traditional market economy.  For example, the average annual level of increase of 
M2 in the former USSR between 1981-1985 was 7.5% [IMF et al., 1990, p.49].  The 
excessive monetary expansion, combined with an absolute price control, caused an 
increase in repressed inflation and forced savings, which, parenthetically speaking, is 
a normal phenomenon in a command economy.  Although it must be noted that the 
level of repressed inflation in the former USSR was most likely higher than in other 
socialist countries such as the GDR, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary.  The increasing 
monetary overhang was neutralized to a certain degree, by the commodity 
inconvertibility of the rouble (the impossibility of the free purchase of goods in 
return for having financial means), especially in the enterprise sector.  What is meant 
here, is the all-encompassing system of dividing the factors of production, as well as 
the stiff control over various types of state enterprise expenditures, such as the wage 
fund or the means intended for investment [McKinnon, 1991]. 
The partial and sometimes rather chaotic liberalization of the perestroika 
period, brought with it an increase in the commodity convertibility of the rouble and 
an increase in the money velocity. The effects of the liberalization were not 
neutralized by a more disciplined monetary and fiscal policy.  Adversely, the gradual 
decomposition of the central political authority and its function of repression, an 
increase in the autonomies of the republics, a loss of fiscal control over state 
enterprises, the already mentioned willingness to "buy" social support, as well as 
unfavorable external factors (the fall of oil prices on the world market) led to a 
fundamental increase in the budget deficit and monetary expansion.  This was 
accompanied by a worsening current account balance of the  balance of payments 
and a fall in industrial production and national income (beginning in 1990). 
According to the estimates of the International Monetary Fund, the annual 
index of the increase of M2 was 8.5% in 1986, 14.7% in 1987, 14.1% in 1988, 14.8% 
in 1989, and 15.3% in 1990 [IMF et al., 1990, p.49].  The main factor determining the 
increase in monetary stock was the increasing budget deficit.  According to the same 
estimates it was:  2.4% of GDP in 1985, 6.2% in 1986, 8.4% in 1987, 9.2% in 1988, 
8.5% in 1989 [IMF et al., 1990, p.10].  In 1991 it already reached the astronomical 
level of 31% of GDP for the Russian Federation [IMF, 1992, p.12]. 
This deficit was financed exclusively by credits from of the central bank 
(Gosbank) of the USSR, and the republic's central banks (to a lesser degree).  Aside 
from this, there was obviously an immense credit expansion for enterprises.  Here 
the lead role was played out by the republic's banks.  As a result, a peculiar Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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"division of labor" was formed in the stirring of hyperinflation: while the USSR 
Gosbank was financing the country's budget deficit, the republic banks were amply 
supplying credit for enterprises as well as financing the budget deficit of the 
republics.  Furthermore, in 1991, and maybe even in 1990, the republic central banks 
stopped following the guidelines set by the USSR Gosbank regarding the size of 
credit issues.  This, in reality, indicated the beginning of the disintegration of the 
rouble zone. 
A series of additional events, such as the exchange of 50 and 100 rouble notes 
in February 1991, the administrative increase in the prices of staple food items and 
services from April 1, 1991, as well as the, lasting since the summer of 1991, 
discussion on the liberalization of prices, further increased the money velocity and 
market panic.  As a result of the political decomposition of the all-union 
government, the administrational price control was weakening.  Nonetheless, on the 
staple foods market this control was maintained (together with high, and constantly 
increasing subsidies).  As a result, the high inflation took on a partly repressed and 
partly open character. 
3.  Liberalization of prices and the domestic market. 
The Gaidar team considered the liberalization of prices to be a priority task.  Its 
goal was the removal of goods shortages, the introduction of adaptive market 
mechanisms, as well as the remedy of the state budget, where the expenditure side 
was dominated by subsidies for goods and services. 
The first, fundamental step in the price liberalization sphere was taken on 
January 2, 1992 [Koen and Phillips, 1993].  The operation was then unfortunately not 
complete.  The pressures of various political, administrative, and industrial lobbies 
caused that the administrative price control on a number of consumption goods 
(bread, milk, cheese, baby food, sugar, salt, margarine, matches, alcohol products, 
gasoline, oil, etc.) as well as primary and intermediary goods (primarily coal, crude 
oil and its by-products, electricity, all transport tariffs ) was maintained.  A control of 
maximum trade margins was introduced (not more than 25%, and 45% in the Far 
North territories), as well as an extensive price control of the so-called monopolistic 
producers.  The latter one was based on, above all, the control of the average profit 
rate in relation to costs.  The achieved effect was such, that goods with controlled 
prices remained mostly unavailable in official retail sale. 
The  second stage of the price deregulation was introduced through the 
government decision of March 7, 1992, when part of the thus far controlled prices 
were freed, and part of the administrative price decisions were passed to local and 
regional levels.  This pertained to, for example, the prices of bread, milk and milk 
by-products, margarine, sugar, salt, matches, as well as transport tariffs on local 
travel.  Local administrations responded differently to the authority passed on to 
them.  Some of the prices were liberalized, while others still remained the subject of Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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control.  There were also significant regional variations.2  In places where price 
control officially remained, it was not always effectively executed. 
The third stage in the deregulation of prices, can be considered the decree of 
the president of the Russian Federation "About the state regulation of prices for some 
types of energy resources", doing away with, as of September 18, 1992, the upper 
limit of crude oil and gas prices.  This was not, however, a complete liberalization, 
as a progressive tax on producers exceeding 4,000 roubles per ton was maintained.  
This ceiling was increased several times, as inflation increased, and in spring 1993, 
entirely eliminated.  Since then, export quotas, have become the main instrument in 
the regulation of domestic prices for crude oil and gas. 
Generally, the price liberalization performed in 1992 can be considered 
significant, taking into account the starting point of reform at the end of 1991, as 
well as politically daring, for a country where for 60 years nearly all the prices have 
been controlled by the government.  There remained, however, many forms of 
indirect intervention of state organs, even in the sphere intended for free prices, 
such as the afore-mentioned anti-monopoly control and the maximum profitability 
control, or finally the special discount credit to supplement working capital for those 
enterprises which did not raise prices and salaries in 1992. 
At the end of December 1992, the new prime minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, 
undertook an attempt to return to a tighter price control.  The decree dated 
December 31, 1992, foresaw the introduction of percentage profitability ceilings for 
the producers of a number of consumption and supply goods considered 
fundamental [Delpla and Afanassiev, 1993]. 
This decree was, however, criticized by some of the members of the 
government, including deputy prime ministers Boris Fiodorov and Anatolii Chubais, 
who were not present during its passage.  As a result, a following decree was 
passed, dated January 18, 1993, which abolished profitability norms for non-
monopolistic enterprises, and planned to shorten the list of those monopolistic 
enterprises which had a limited independence in the area of establishing prices. 
Further steps at deregulation occurred during 1993. As it was mentioned above, 
the progressive tax regulating prices of crude oil and natural gas was eliminated in 
spring 1993.  In June 1993, the price of coal was freed and part of the subsidies 
were withdrawn.  A similar operation was carried out in October 1993, in regards to 
prices of bread. 
                                       
2  An extreme case is the example of the ulyanovskaya oblast' where the regional authorities 
maintained throughout 1992 and 1993 far-reaching price control on basic food items, supported by 
price subsidies from the regional budget.  In order for this system to work, it was obviously necessary 
to maintain a ration system for food, as well as a quasi-directive targets (so-called state orders - 
goszakaz) for the kolhoz and sovhoz, food industry enterprises, as well as the monopolized 
wholesale and retail trade.  In this oblast', the privatization process was actually stopped [see 
Illatianov and Yasin, 1993]. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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The gradual liberalization of prices and rules for goods turnover were also 
accompanied by the gradual limitation of the administrative division of resources and 
state orders (goszakaz).  Similarly to price controls, part of the authority in this 
sphere was decentralized to the regional and local level.  Here as well, spontaneous 
deregulation processes occurred here, related to the political strengthening of the 
management lobby on the one hand, and the progressive weakening of the state 
authority on the other. 
The progressiveness of the price deregulation, withdrawal of the administrative 
regulation of goods turnover, and the partial liberalization of foreign trade (see 
below) caused the shortages on both the consumption and the supply market to 
remain throughout 1992 and the beginning of 1993.  A clear improvement in this 
area occurred only in the summer 1993, together with a relative stabilization of the 
exchange rate and an apparent influx of competitive import. 
4.  Partial liberalization of foreign trade. 
The liberalization of foreign relations in the Russian economy, especially in 
export, turned out to be much more limited than the liberalization of the domestic 
market.  This was due to, it would appear, both the dominating mentality of a 
shortage economy, as well as the interests of specific lobbies of the administrative 
apparatus, wanting to continue controlling, in their opinion strategic, transactions in 
foreign trade. 
The first stage of changes occurred on January 1, 1992, based on the 
presidential decree of the Russian Federation no. 213, dated November 15, 1992, 
"About the liberalization of foreign economic activity on the territory of the Russian 
Federation".  All enterprises then gained access to the foreign exchange market, 
either through the possibility of a direct purchase of foreign currency from another 
enterprise, or through participation in a currency auction.  Aside from this, the 
centralized system of the foreign exchange allocation was maintained.  The public 
also gained the possibility of free sale or purchase of foreign currency in a network 
of private exchange points. 
The fundamental problem remains, however, in the broad sphere of export 
control, made up of: 
1/  The system of export quotas on products such as fish and fish by-products, 
coal, crude oil and by-products, natural gas, non-organic chemical products, 
styrene, phenol, tars, wood, sawn timber, cellulose, paper, pig-iron, ferro-alloys, 
steel, rolling-mill products, pipes, non-ferrous metals and their by-products, 
non-ferrous scrap-metals, mineral fertilizer, ammoniac, methanol, recyclable 
paper, textiles and textile products, steel waste-metal, medicine, etc.  Part of the 
export quotas was divided by administrative means, part through tender 
[Rossijskoje Prawitiel'stwo, 1991, appendix 1]. 
2/  The system of export licenses for, among others: armaments, explosives, 
radioactive materials, precious metals and stones and their by-products, 
psychotropic and narcotic chemicals, poisons, milk and milk by-products, 
margarine, baby food, salt, electricity, matches, meat and its by-products, wild Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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game, wild plants, ivory, horns, corals, medicine [Rossijskoje Prawitiel'stwo, 
1991, appendix 2 and 3]. 
3/  Obligatory surrender of part of the foreign currency. 
4/  Export tariffs with a branch differentiation of rates. 
The effects of the above system included maintaining a multiple exchange rate 
for the rouble.  Next to the rate at the exchange, there functioned a free-market 
tourist rate (about 110-130 roubles for 1 USD); the so-called quasi-commercial rate 
(110 roubles per 1 USD), used in centralized import and obligatory surrender of 10% 
of foreign currency from export to CBR; the special commercial rate (half of the 
previous), used in the obligatory surrender of the next 40% foreign currency from 
export; finally the so-called official rate (initially 0.60 roubles for 1 USD, later raised 
to 10 roubles for 1 USD), used in, among other things, the settling of some credits 
and servicing diplomatic posts.  I am not exhausting the entire list of special rates 
and convertibility tables, such as the one in "Aeroflot" (25 roubles for 1 USD). 
The currency market was still very fragmented, and many of the old currency 
restrictions of the USSR Gosbank still obliged in the first half of 1992.  Therefore, for 
example, the foreign exchange cash market was entirely separated from trade 
operations. 
The described export restrictions as well as the fragmentation of the currency 
market and easy accessibility to cheap credit caused that the supply of foreign 
currency was low.  Part of the potential export was held up by administrative and 
financial restrictions.  An additional anti-export stimulus was the lowered and 
administratively controlled prices for crude oil and coal, causing their exaggerated 
use domestically, while they represent products easiest to export.  Exporters did not 
hurry with the sale of foreign currency, hoping for a lowering of the rate of the 
rouble.  The obligatory surrender of foreign currency did not encourage debt 
collection from abroad.  All this caused an artificial overvaluing of foreign currency 
and an undervaluing of the rouble on the exchange market. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the created system of administrative 
barriers and fiscal burdens in export turned out to be minerly effective, among other 
things due to the lack of tariff boundaries between Russia and the other countries of 
the CIS (the transport of goods, non-ferrous metals for example, into other republics, 
and from there re-exporting it beyond the CIS borders) as well as numerous others 
exceptions and exemptions (from export quotas, export tax, the obligatory surrender 
of foreign currency, etc.), resulting from pressures of various lobbies. 
Import policy during the same period was much more liberalized.  Up until the 
end of August 1992, import tariffs were practically not collected, and up until the 
end of 1992, nor was the value added tax (VAT) from imports.  A certain amount of 
import quotas and licenses were maintained (significantly greater than in the case of 
export).  The role of the main import barrier was played by the artificially high 
foreign currency exchange rate.  The Russian economy, in practice, still remained a 
closed economy, and the balance of payments showed great tension. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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The second stage of the liberalization of foreign trade occurred on July 1, 1992.  
A single, market exchange rate for the rouble in relation to foreign currency was 
implemented.  From September 1, 1992, it was also utilized in credit operations.  In 
practice, however, part of the so-called basic import (food, medicine) was still 
realized with a heavily lowered exchange rate for the dollar (20-50 roubles for 1 
USD), theoretically recompensated from the budget, yet the current budget did not 
take into account these subsidies to credited import.  In the first half of 1992, the 
privileged import represented 40% of total import, while in the second half of 1992, 
it fell to 10%. 
On July 1, 1992, also introduced was a single norm for the obligatory surrender  
of foreign currency (50%), but at the market rate.  Export taxes were differentiated, 
mainly on energy resources, and the list of export quotas and licenses was 
substantially narrowed. 
A system of centralized export of crude oil and natural gas was created, based 
on the purchase of these products by the government at domestic prices, much 
lower than world prices, and exporting it abroad at world prices.  It is thus a 
peculiar form of treasury monopoly.  The difference between the world and 
domestic price does not however constitute budget income and is not included in 
budgetary statistics.  This is due to the fact that the acquired foreign currency is 
generally destined directly for the servicing of foreign debt as well as centralized 
import (for example, grain or medicine).  This in reality constitutes maintaining a 
system of differentiated currency exchange rates. 
On August 1, 1992, a single 15% tariff rate was introduced, and from the 
beginning of 1993, a VAT in import.  At the beginning of 1993, import tariffs were 
differentiated.  In the case of food, medicine, and most consumption articles, a zero 
rate was used, and in the case of machines and appliances a rate of 15% (!).  It is a 
result of the pressures of the lobby of the domestic machine industry, most likely 
one of the least effective, yet the one with the most political influence. 
The described regime of trade policy remained fundamentally unchanged 
throughout 1993, aside from the, undertaken in the summer of that year, attempt at 
limiting the number of exporters of strategic raw materials.  Under the authority of 
the law of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation dated November 11, 
1993, the next, though not very radical, limitation of the list of goods covered by 
export quotas and licenses was performed (valid from January 1, 1994).  Export 
quotas will encompass: crude oil together with gas concentrate, part of the oil-based 
products, hydrocarbon resources, natural gas, electricity, part of non-ferrous metals, 
cellulose, wheat, sunflower and soy seeds, ethyl alcohol, fish, and caviar.  The list of 
licensed goods will encompass the same items as above, and additionally nitrolime 
and phosphates, as well as uncut diamonds. 
There is also discussion and political bargaining about a larger differentiation of 
import tariffs, including an introduction of clear prohibitive tariff barriers for the 
import of automobiles and a number of machine industry products. 
 Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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5.  Radical acceleration of the privatization process. 
The privatization of the Russian economy appears so far to be the most 
dynamic and consistent element of the transformation policy, though not free from 
heated political disputes and professional controversy.  The limitations of the 
framework of this article do not allow for a more extensive description of this 
process, the more so as there are a number of other studies dealing with the various 
aspects of the Russian privatization.  [Blanchard et al., 1993;  D¹browski et al., 1993;  
Jermakowicz and Pañków, forthcoming].  I will therefore limit myself to presenting 
the most important trends of the privatization policy.  They include: 
1.  Small privatization, based on the sale for cash (through public auction) of state 
assets, mainly stores, repair shops, small enterprises.  This process, initiated 
with the help of IFC (International Finance Corporation) experts in Nizhni 
Novgorod in the beginning of 1992, spread throughout the territory of Russia.  
Until the end of August 1993, via this path 81 thousand enterprises have been 
privatized, with a joint budgetary income of 710 billion roubles [Obzor, 1993, 
table 12].  Already in April 1993, the share of private enterprises in trade 
amounted to 52.3%, in public catering - 47.0%, and in consumer services - 
52.3% [Chubais and Vishnevskaya, 1993]. 
2.  Mass corporatization of most of the mid-size and large state enterprises.  The 
main effort of this process occurred in fall 1992 and beginning 1993.  On July 1, 
1993, among the 17,470 enterprises selected for corporatization, 10,663 (61.0% 
of the total) had approval for privatization (meaning they had passed the 
second to last step of corporatization), 6,878 (39.4% of the total) had already 
been registered as a stock corporation (final stage of corporatization) 
[Jermakowicz and Pañków, forthcoming, p.78]. 
3.  Emission of privatization vouchers for all the citizens of the Russian Federation 
on October 1, 1992.  The nominal value of one voucher is 10,000 roubles.  It 
was the equivalent of about 80 dollars at the time of decision to emit the 
vouchers, at the beginning of July 1992, and about 30 dollars at the actual 
beginning of emission, October 1992.  The voucher is a bearer instrument, and 
is easily transferable.3 
4.  A large privatization of enterprises, formerly encompassed by corporatization, 
according to three models, varying by the extent of privileges to insiders 
(management and personnel).  In each of these methods the sale of vouchers 
plays an essential role.  The large privatization process was initiated  in 
December 1992 and gained significant pace in 1993.  In the period from 
December 1992 to May 1993, at the voucher auctions, 1,725 enterprises were 
sold [Boycko and Shleifer, 1993].  The second method, giving the largest 
                                       
3  In November 1993, the market value of 1 voucher was around 35,000 roubles, in other 
words 30 USD. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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preferences to the personnel, is definitely the dominating one.  It has been 
utilized in about two-thirds of privatizing enterprises [Jermakowicz and Pañków, 
forthcoming, p.87]. 
5.  The formation of open mutual funds, receiving privatization vouchers from 
citizens and investing in their name in privatizing enterprises.  The process of 
forming the funds was initiated in the first months of 1993, and gained pace in 
late spring and summer 1993.  In June 1993, over 450 such funds were 
operating [Jermakowicz and Pañków, forthcoming, p.125]. 
6.  The spontaneous emergence of new private firms, mainly in trade and services 
(including street trade).4  Part of the newly forming private firms do business in 
the so-called second economy, meaning that their activity is partially or entirely 
unregistered. 
7.  The formation of firms with a share of foreign capital (sovmestnye 
predpriyatiya).  This process is not yet advanced.  It is concentrated mainly in 
trade, services, and small scale manufacturing as well as in certain regions 
(Moscow, St. Petersburg, Far East). 
8.  The initiation of agricultural privatization, authorized by of a special decree of 
President Yeltsin from the end of October 1993.  Earlier, transformations in 
agriculture were effectively blocked politically by a strong kolhoz-sovhoz lobby 
in the Supreme Council, which did not permit for the resolution of 
constitutional amendments and bills allowing land turnover. 
A complex and consistent policy of the State Committee on Managing State 
Property allowed Russia to achieve, in a relatively short period of time, significant 
quantitative results in the privatization sphere, placing it in a position of a definite 
leader among post-soviet countries, and perhaps even n comparison to certain   
Central and Eastern European countries. 
Denationalization appears to be irrevocable in Russia.  It also indirectly 
contributes to the weakening of the traditional branch structures of management as 
well as relics of the command economy system.  The topic of controversy are, 
however, the qualitative characteristics of Russian privatization.  The most often 
mentioned reservations are: 
1.  Corporatization and the so-called large privatization were not preceded by a 
deconcentration of the existing state enterprises, especially in industry and 
foreign trade, and often an elimination of various regulations giving them 
monopolistic rights.  This constitutes a danger of transforming many of the so 
far state monopolists into private ones, and can also make the process of 
structural changes at the enterprise level more difficult. 
2.  Privatization is being performed  in conditions of high inflation, a not fully 
liberalized economy, and a significantly imperfect competition, especially 
                                       
4  There is, however, a lack of credible statistical data allowing to illustrate this process. Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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foreign.  This constitutes a danger of the participants of the privatization 
process making erroneous investment decisions, as well as many bankruptcies 
of privatized enterprises in the future.  Formally privatized enterprises are still 
functioning in "soft" budgetary constraint conditions.  This also creates a 
possibility of the appearance of strong pressure groups, opposing consistent 
stabilization, the hardening of budgetary constraints for enterprises, and the 
liberalization of the Russian economy. 
3.  The realization of both the small and the large privatization so far has given an 
immense advantage to insiders, that is the enterprise personnel and 
management, which is, for the most part, not changed since the previous 
system (as opposed to, for example, the far reaching personnel changes among 
directors of state enterprises in Poland in 1990-1991).  This questions the ability 
of privatized enterprises to perform deeper adjustive measures, such as the 
excessive employment. 
4.  Similar doubt also pertains to the threat of excessive dispersion of property as a 
result of strong preferentialism for personnel as well as the voucher method.  
As a result, a distinct foreign strategic investor, interested in increasing profits, 
might not appear in privatized enterprises.  Counteracting this danger, 
according to the authors of the Russian privatization, should be the 
spontaneously emerging mutual funds. 
6.  The Failed Stabilization of 1992. 
One of the goals of the Gaidar team was, aside from the liberalization of prices, 
macroeconomic stabilization.  This goal was not, however, achieved, partially as a 
result of opposition to it by successive governors of the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR).  Table 1 illustrates the dynamics of the increase of the main monetary 
aggregates in 1992-1993.  It irrefutably shows that the money supply was relatively 
restrictive (this above all pertains to the formation of the monetary base) only in 
January 1992, when there was a repeated fall of the real stock of money, and at the 
same time neutralization of a significant part of the monetary overhang.  Over the 
next four months, base money (H) and M1 grew at a pace of several percent a 
month (more or less at the pace of inflation), and the wider monetary aggregates 
(M2 and M3) - somewhat slower.  This latter phenomenon was connected to the 
constantly increasing participation of cash and demand deposits in the general stock 
of money. 
6.1  Sources of monetary expansion 
The main factor in monetary expansion, in the period since May 1992, has 
been the increase of CBR credit for commercial banks.  A significant part of that 
increase was for special lines of refinancing credit for chosen branches:  the agro-
industrial sector, the defense industry sector, the energy sector, finally for the regions 
of the far North and far East.  The budget deficit, due to its limited dimensions, was 
not, in the first five months an essential source of the creation of monetary 
expansion (see Tables 2 and 3). Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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Table 1: INCREASE OF MONETARY AGGREGATES, 1992-1993 (previous month 
= 100) 
 
Month Monetary  aggregate 
 M0  MB  M1  M2  M3 
January 1992  110.8  101.3  115.7  112.7  112.5 
February 1992  113.9  115.0  113.9  112.1  111.9 
March 1992  118.3  130.6  117.6  114.1  113.9 
April 1992  128.2  120.4  112.5  110.4  110.3 
May 1992  115.1  119.4  110.6  109.2  109.1 
June 1992  124.5  167.7  131.2  128.0  127.8 
July 1992  141.2  114.0  127.6  125.5  125.3 
August 1992  125.1  198.1  132.9  130.9  130.8 
September 1992  118.1   93.1  133.0  131.5  131.4 
October 1992  120.6  117.3  127.9  127.0  127.0 
November 1992  120.4  123.3  105.4  105.2  105.2 
December 1992  124.4  118.1  120.7  120.4  120.3 
January 1993  113.4  105.4  119.2  118.3  118.3 
February 1993  119.3  113.0  110.0  110.0  110.0 
March 1993  112.0  121.0  115.9  117.0  117.0 
April 1993  128.5  114.0  122.9  122.9  122.9 
May 1993  120.9  115.0  118.6  119.0  119.0 
June 1993  127.0  114.0  101.4  101.5  101.5 
July 1993  122.2  134.0  138.0  137.0  137.0 
August 1993  119.0  110.0  114.0  114.0  114.0 
September 1993  115.0  107.0  103.0  103.0  103.0* 
Explanations: M0 - cash money; MB - monetary base of CBR; M1 = M0 + demand deposits; M2 = M1 
+ time deposits; M3 = M2 + certificates of government debt 
Source: CBR data and data of Macroeconomic and Finance Unit of Ministry of Finance (MFU). Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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Table 2: SEIGNORAGE (quarterly, % of GDP) 
 











Q1 1992  11 --- --- --- 
Q2 1992  12 11* 12 35 
Q3 1992  19 25 23 67 
Q4 1992  20 11 5 36 
Q1 1993  6 12 3 21 
Q2 1993  6 5 3 14 
* Data concern only credit for federal budget (no data concerning extra-budgetary funds) 
Source: MFU data 
 
Table 3: DEFICIT OF CONSOLIDATED AND FEDERAL BUDGET OF RUSSIA, 1992 
 
Month  Deficit of consol. budget  Deficit of federal budget 
1992   bn rbl  % of GDP  bn rbl.  % of GDP 
I - III  (21.5) (1.6)* 4.7 0.3 
I - VI  215.9 5.4 301.3 7.5 
I - IX  544.1 6.6 716.4 8.7 
I - XII  641.9 4.3 957.9 6.4 
* budget surplus 
Source: D¹browski et al. (1993), tabl. 11.3 i 11.4. 
 
Just the same, the growth of the active saldo of correspondence accounts of the 
CBR with other republic banks (that is the import of credit money, created in other 
countries of the rouble zone) has not yet gained immense proportions (see Table 2).  
In this last matter, there is no absolute certainty due to the low credibility of the 
interrepublic settlement statistics - the system of correspondence accounts of the 
CBR began functioning only since March 1, 1992, while the accounts of the former 
USSR Gosbank were not closed until the fall of 1992. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
CASE Foundation  Page 16 
Since June 1992, the already rather expansive monetary policy of the CBR 
succumbed to a further dramatic relaxation, which is clearly illustrated in Tables 1 
and 2.  It was a cumulative effect of the simultaneous influence of three immense 
factors of the creation of the monetary base of the CBR. 
1/  An essential worsening of the budgetary situation from May 1992, which caused 
the rapid accumulation of net credit of the CBR to the government sector, 
beginning in June 1992 (see Tables 2 and 3). 
2/  The accumulation of active saldo on interrepublic correspondence accounts of 
the CBR, above all with the Ukraine and Kazakhstan [D¹browski, 1993;   
Granville and Lushin, 1993] - see point 8. 
3/  The accelerated increase in the internal credit expansion in Russia. 
The pace of the increase of the monetary base (H) and M1 exceeded 25% per 
month in the third and fourth quarter of 1992.  In November 1992, there was a 
distinct slow down in the pace of the increase of M1 and M2, which later returned 
to about 20% per month.  M2 and M3 grew slower due to the lack of a nominal 
increase in savings deposits as well as in long-term bonds.  A confirmation of this 
tendency is the systematically increasing share of M1 in M3 - from 80.0% on January 
1, 1992 to 97.4% a year later.  This indicates a disappearance of the inclination to 
save sensu stricto, which does not appear surprising in conditions of high inflation 
and low interest rates.  The predominant part of the money balance is kept for 
current transaction purposes, in the form of cash, or in the form of demand deposits.  
Table 2 also illustrates the immense seignorage of the CBR, calculated as a sum 
of CBR credits, given to the budget, commercial banks, and countries in the rouble 
zone.  The share of seignorage in GDP was from about 11% in the first quarter of 
1992 to 67% in the third quarter of 1992 (and 89.4% in August 1992) - [Russian 
Economic Trends, 1993,  table 8].  This illustrates the immense level of the 
inflationary tax, placed by the CBR on money stocks in the Russian economy.  This 
policy did not rescue GDP and industrial production, and at best it delayed their fall 
in the second half of 1992 and beginning of 1993 (see Table 4). Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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Table 4: RUSSIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, NET MATERIAL PRODUCT AND 
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT (the same period of previous year = 100, constant prices) 
 
Period GDP  NMP  Industr.  output 
1991 - all year  85  89  85 
Q1 1992  *  86  87 
Q2 1992  *  78  86 
Q3 1993  *  76  76 
Q4 1993  *  80  77 
1992 - all year  81  80  81 
Q1 1993    81  81 
Source: Russian Economic Trends [1993b], tabl. 28. 
 
6.2  Cheap credits for the economy and negative interest rates. 
The credit expansion was performed under the banner of rescuing the Russian 
industry, supporting its restructuring, and clearing payment arrears.  Aside from the 
traditional instrument of special lines of credit with preferential interest rates, two 
new phenomena should be noted: 
1.  At the end of July 1992, based on of a telegram of the acting governor of the 
CBR Victor Gerashchenko, a special system of clearing payment arrears 
between enterprises was utilized, compiled in commercial banks in the so-
called  kartoteka no. 2.  This operation was in fact performed on separate 
accounts in commercial banks, yet in the end the final settlement of the arrears 
was connected with additional injection of about 500 billion roubles of 
additional credit for the economy starting from October 1992. 
2.  Also in July 1992, a special line of strongly subsidized credit in the amount of 
300 billion roubles was utilized for the supplementation of circulating capital of 
enterprises, divided by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and 
department Ministries.  This credit was renewed twice - in September and 
December 1992 - for a total of about 600 billion roubles. 
Both of these forms of providing credit constituted de facto additional funding 
of the government sector and were tied to an additional budget deficit, not displayed 
in the official statistics due to the lack of adaptation of the budgetary methodology 
and classification to international standards. 
During the entire period of reform, the interest rate of the CBR was strongly 
negative in the real terms.  It was in fact raised from 8% to 20% in January of 1992, Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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and then gradually to 80% in May 1992, and 100% from April 1, 1993, yet it was still 
highly insufficient in conditions of the significantly faster increase of prices.   
Furthermore, the 80% rate was rarely utilized in 1992 - with the prevailing credit 
having a preferential interest rate of 10% to 20% annually.  In reality, the interest rate 
on the interbank market was in 1992 generally higher than 80%.  The low interest 
rate discouraged saving, artificially increased demand for credit, had a negative 
influence on the rouble's noting on the currency exchange, and finally, was 
conducive to the increase of payment arrears. 
6.3.  Budget deficit 
Table 3 presents a synthetic illustration of the events in fiscal policy in Russia 
in 1992.  It is easy to distinguish three time periods, varied by their ability to balance 
the state budget: 
1.  The period from January to April 1992, which was characterized by a relatively 
balanced state budget and its comparatively low share in GDP.  At the 
beginning of this period, an ambitious and complex reform of the tax system 
was initiated, introducing a value added tax (nalog od dobavlennoi stoimosti - 
NDS), a single income tax, as well as a personal income tax. 
2.  The period from May to August 1992, which was characterized by an immense 
expansion of budgetary expenditures and a fall in revenues (mainly caused by 
the difficulties in indexing the tax advance - the so-called Tanzi effect). 
3.  The period from September to November 1992, characterized by a substantial 
improvement in balancing the budget in cummulative calculation (in September 
a budgetary surplus was even noted), mainly due to an increase in revenues.  It 
was possible thanks to overcoming problems with the indexing of advances on 
the value added tax and income tax on legal persons, and thanks to an 
inflationary supplying of enterprises with cheap credit, and credit related to the 
clearing of payment arrears.  December brought a renewed deficit increase as a 
result of the need to settle past budgetary obligations. 
Even though the relation of the budget deficit to GDP did not appear to be 
dramatic, relative to other countries, it must be realized that the whole of the deficit 
was instantly monetized.  Furthermore, the official methodology of budget statistics 
hides part of the deficit.  This pertains to, among others, the servicing of foreign 
debt, centralized import at a privileged rate and on credit, budgetary credit for the 
supplementation of working capital of enterprises, as well as numerous 
unappropriated funds.  Also part of the central bank credits, such as the specified 
lines of subsidized credit to individual branches and regions, or the so-called 
technical credits for CIS countries, are actually hidden subsidies, and thus are quasi-
fiscal operations. 
6.4.  Inflation and the currency rate 
The conducted monetary and fiscal policy has been reflected in inflationary trends.  
Table 5 presents indicators of the increase of consumption prices (calculated Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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Table 5: MONTHLY INFLATION IN RUSSIA, 1992-1993 (previous month = 100) 
 Month  Consumer price 
index 
Wholesale   price 
index 
January 1992  345.0  482.2 
February 1992  138.3  174.7 
March 1992  129.8  128.1 
April 1992  121.6  117.0 
May 1992  112.0  123.0 
June 1992  118.6  136.0 
July 1992  111.0  117.0 
August 1992  109.0  113.0 
September 1992  112.0  114.0 
October 1992  123.0  127.0 
November 1992  126.0  127.0 
December 1992  125.0  120.0 
January 1993  126.0  132.0 
February 1993  125.0  130.0 
March 1993  120.0  123.0 
April 1993  123.0  124.0 
May 1993  119.0  119.0 
June 1993  120.0  117.0 
July 1993  122.0  129.0 
August 1993  126.0  127.0 
September 1993  121.0  121.0 
October 1993  122.0    * 
November 1993  115.0   
Source: Russian Economic Trends, Vol.2, No.1, Government of the Russian Federation, 
Whurr Publishers, tabl. A18 i A19; Russian Economic Trends. Monthly Update, 23.03.1993, 
tabl.1. and 29.10.1993, tabl.1. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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according to a basket of consumer goods) and wholesale prices.  In January 1992, 
after the liberalization of most of the prices from administrative control, a single 
powerful increase of them occurred, eliminating most of the accumulated monetary 
overhang  In February, this index fell significantly.  Then from February to August 
1992, a systematic fall in the officially registered inflation rate took place.  In its 
evaluation, it is necessary to take into account seasonal price fluctuations, especially 
for vegetables and fruits, which most likely had a certain influence on the relatively 
low average increase in prices in the summer months (similar to Poland).  From 
September 1992, inflationary tendencies clearly accelerated.  The weekly consumer 
price index was, from the end of September until the beginning of 1993, at the level 
of 4-5%, and the monthly one - about 25%. 
Changes in inflationary trends and expectations were reflected on the currency 
markets.  Table 6 illustrates the free-market currency rate from the end of 1991 until 
the end of 1992, both on the non-cash operations market, meaning the Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), and on the cash market (banks, private 
exchange points, and street transactions). 
The dramatic increase in the price of the dollar on the free market at the end of 
1991 was caused by a tremendous monetary disequilibrium of that period, as well as 
further inflationary expectations related to the planned liberalization of prices.  The 
strong upward tendencies lasted until the end of January 1992.  Then for five months 
the nominal rate of the dollar not only did not increase, but even systematically fell. 
This represented a reflection of a somewhat less expansive budgetary and monetary 
policy of that period, and was also, to a certain degree, a reaction to the speculative 
overvaluing of the exchange rate of the dollar during the period from November 
1991 to January 1992. 
From July 1992, the rate of the dollar has again begun to increase, initially at a 
limited pace, and then - from the end of August - significantly faster.  The spiraling 
devaluation of the rouble became an additional factor of stirring of new high 
inflation (through the prices of imported and exported goods).  Further history of the 
exchange rate fluctuations is a relative stabilization of the rate in November and 
December 1992, rapid depreciation in January, February, and March 1993 and 
another stabilization (see Table 7).  These oscillations on the one hand illustrate 
(with some delay) the fluctuations in the money supply, and also interventionary 
policy of the CBR on the MMBW, and on the other are reflections of the, natural in 
this situation, speculative behavior of the participants of the currency market. 
Only an exceptionally fortunate series of coincidences prevented Russia from 
reaching hyperinflation of 50-100% per month.  In an economy with a more 
advanced financial market as well as more market-oriented behavior on the part of 
enterprises and banks (for example, in Latin America or even in Central Europe) 
stubborn "injections" of an immense amount of new credits into the economy, would 
have to bring about a drastic acceleration in the money velocity.  All owners of 
money balances would attempt to avoid the inflationary tax by escaping, for 
example, from the endangered domestic currency to foreign currencies, gathering a 
inventories of goods, etc.  In Russia such a phenomenon did not occur.  On the 
contrary, in certain months with the largest increases of the monetary base of the 
CBR, the money velocity fell instead of rising (see Table 8). Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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Mid of 11.1991   80  75 
End of 11.1991  105  83 
Mid of 12.1991  144  106 
24.12.1991 169  123 
14.01.1992 180  137 
28.01.1992 230  128 
18.02.1992 170  112 
03.03.1992 140    95 
17.03.1992 160  115 
31.03.1992 160  130 
14.04.1992 155  125 
28.04.1992 144  124 
14.05.1992 128  124 
02.06.1992 113  123 
16.06.1992 119  125 
30.06.1992 135  140 
16.07.1992 136  143 
30.07.1992 161  165 
04.08.1992 161  165 
18.08.1992 163  181 
25.08.1992 168  187 
03.09.1992 211  206 
22.09.1992 241  221 
29.09.1992 254  270 
08.10.1992 334  295 
27.10.1992 393  343 
10.11.1992 402  409 
24.11.1992 450  453 
08.12.1992 419  440 
22.12.1992 415  469 
Source: Russian Economic Trends (1993a),  tabl. A21; Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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Source: Russian Economic Trends (1993b), tabl. A21; Obzor (1993), tabl.6; MFU data.  Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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Table 8: MONEY VELOCITY IN RUSSIA, 1992-1993 
Month monthly 
GDP:M2 
























Source: Russian Economic Trends (1993b), tabl. A16; MFU data. 
The explanations of this phenomenon should be sought in, among others, the 
technical inefficiency of the banking system, its incompetence for a rapid absorption 
of new "injections" of refinancing credit from the CBR (especially the branch or 
territory aimed special lines of subsidized credit), the lack of development in the 
interbank credit market, in the lack of interest and competence of enterprises in 
protecting their money balances, etc. 
7.  Stabilization efforts in 1993. 
7.1  Prevention of the danger of hyperinflation at the beginning of 1993. 
The description of the second year of economic reforms in Russia should begin 
at the moment of Gaidar's leaving the position of acting prime minister in mid-
December 1992.  As seen in the analysis performed in the previous point, the Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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macroeconomic situation at this point was exceptionally difficult.  The increasing 
confrontations between the President and the government (with its own tensions) on 
the one hand, and the Supreme Council on the other hand blocking the possibility 
of any relatively coherent policy in this matter.  In spite of the achieved political 
concessions, Gaidar had to leave.  He was replaced as Prime Minister by Victor 
Chernomyrdin.  It appeared that Russia is straying from the attempts at market 
reforms and is choosing the Ukrainian way of conserving the relics of the command 
system.  It, however, was not like that. 
The new deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Boris Fiodorov 
attempted to achieve that, which Gaidar was not able to - control the high inflation.  
The effect of his efforts is not unanimous - though the danger of hyperinflation was 
in fact avoided in the beginning of 1993 and the monthly rate of price growth was 
lowered, it nonetheless remained at the level of about 20% (see Table 5). 
Fiodorov in his efforts at stabilization met three significant political obstacles - 
the CBR, the Supreme Council, as well as the industrial lobby inside the government.  
The management of the CBR was subordinate to the parliament, and the mentality of 
most of its members remained in the era of the USSR Gosbank, from which it was 
borne.  Fiodorov was however successful in appointing an interdepartmental credit 
commission, which partially controls the monetary policy of the CBR.  This control is 
not fully effective in practice, which was illustrated by the CBR decision to exchange 
old bank notes at the end of July 1993, without prior consultation with the Minister 
of Finance. 
The size of the credit emission were, however, significantly limited in the 
spring of this year, which is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2.  This especially pertains to 
credit for commercial banks and for other CIS countries.  This did not, however, 
provide proportional results in lowering the rate of inflation.  Furthermore, at the 
end of the summer 1993, a distinct acceleration could be noticed.  In August the 
inflation was 26%, and in September - 21%.  The money velocity was therefore 
systematically increasing (see Table 8).  The phenomenon of a calm reaction by 
economic entities to high inflation, mentioned earlier, belonged to the past.  The real 
value of free resources of commercial banks fell on the correspondence accounts of 
the CBR.  The credit multiplier increased.  Economic entities learned to avoid the 
inflationary tax.  This is, in part, an effect of privatization and an increased interest in 
the optimal allocation of monetary resources. 
An additional factor accelerating the money velocity was the ill-fated exchange 
of bank notes.  There occurred an increase in the inflow of cash in roubles from the 
other CIS countries.  Furthermore, as a result of the exchange, it turned out that 
there is at least 3 trillion roubles more in circulation, than is noted in the balance-
sheets of the CBR [Veselov, 1993].  This fact seriously questions the credibility of the 
entire monetary statistics of the CBR.  It could then be that not only the increase in 
the pace of monetary circulation, but also a larger than noted by the official statistics, 
emission of money is responsible for the renewed increase in the rate of inflation. 
 Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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7.2.  The agreement with the International Monetary Fund and its 
realization 
In June 1993, the government of the Russian Federation negotiated an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (also signed by the governor of the 
CBR, Gerashchenko), within the framework of the newly formed (specially for the 
countries of the former USSR) Systemic Transformation Facility - (STF), in the 
amount of 3 billion USD.  The credit was to be granted in two phases.  The first of 
them, in the amount of 1.5 billion USD, was received by Russia in August 1993, 
immediately after the acceptance of the agreement by the managing board of the 
IMF.  The second installment was to be initiated after a review of the program in 
September 1993.  The agreement  with the IMF assumed relatively calm goals of 
macroeconomic policy as well as limited obligations in the sphere of systemic 
change: 
1/  Lowering of monthly inflation to single digit level at the end of 1993, and 
further advances in this area in 1994. 
2/  Slowing of credit expansion by the CBR.  For the first half of 1993, the 
maximum allowed increase in overall credits of the CBR was set at the level of 
19.0% of GDP (2,890 billion roubles in the II quarter), for three quarters - 15.9% 
of GDP (6,930 billion roubles in the II and III quarter), and for the entire year - 
13.8% of GDP (10,544 billion roubles between March 30 and December 31, 
1993).  Credit for the government sector should not exceed 7.3% of GDP for the 
duration of the program.  Direct CBR credits for economic entities were to gain 
the approval of the already mentioned Commission on Credit Policy.  The 
interest rate for CBR refinancing credit could not be lower than 7% below the 
interest rate on the interbank market.  The Russian authorities obliged not to 
issue new credit for the clearing of payment arrears between enterprises (the 
so-called  wzaimozacziot, which significantly contributed to the monetary 
expansion of the second half of 1992). 
3/  Not exceeding, by the cash deficit ot the enlarge government sector, the level of 
3,278 billion roubles in the first half of 1993 (8.6% of GDP), 7,104 billion 
roubles in the first three quarters of 1993 (9.0% of GDP), and 10,141 billion 
roubles over all of 1993 (8.3% of GDP).  Part of this deficit was to be financed 
by the emission of government bonds in the sum of 650 billion roubles. 
4/  Limited cuts in budgetary expenditures.  These were mainly to deal with a 40% 
reduction in import subsidies (mainly wheat), a reduction of the internal 
subsidies for wheat by an additional 0,5 trillion roubles, limiting the financing of 
preferential credits (by 336 billion rouble), subsidies to the mining industry (1 
trillion rouble reduction). 
5/  Increase in budgetary revenues through raising the excise tax for crude oil and 
natural gas (and by with this method obtaining an additional 600 billion 
roubles), more effective administration of funds from the sale of products 
imported on credit, mainly wheat (so-called counterpart funds), gradual 
elimination of tax preferences and discouraging the introduction of new ones. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
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6/  Managing a floating exchange rate and non-interference by the CBR on the 
currency market with the intention of maintaining the rate at a given level.  In 
the agreement it was, however, clearly emphasized that a fixed rate policy is 
planned for the future.  The Russian side is also obliged to broaden the access 
to the currency market for non-residents and introduce a daily noting of the 
rate.  The net international reserves of the CBR should be no smaller than 4.4 
billion USD at the end of June, no smaller than 3.4 billion USD at the end of 
September, and not less than 2.4 billion USD at the end of December 1993.  
The fall of net reserves was supposed to be supplemented tranche of the STF 
credit in such a way that the gross international reserves of the CBR were to 
increase from 5.8 billion USD at the end of June to 6.8 billion USD until the end 
of 1993. 
7/  Export quotas were to be increased by 20% for non-energy products, and by 
100% for energy products.  Most of the quantitative limitations in export were to 
be removed until the end of 1993, and in regards to oil, oil by-products, and 
natural gas - until the end of 1994.  Also foreseen was not increasing the 
amount of centralized export (above all oil) and its limitation in 1994 to one-
third of the 1993 level. 
8/  Continuation of privatization and a series of other institutional reforms, such as 
the approval of a new civil and commercial code, bankruptcy law, removal of 
restrictions in agricultural economy, etc. 
9/  Regulate the functioning of the rouble zone through reaching the appropriate 
agreements with the other post-soviet countries expressing interest in further 
use of the Russian rouble as means of payment.  Acceptance of principle that 
new credits for CIS countries will be granted only through the mediation of the 
state budget. 
The realization of the agreement (in spite of its relatively mild conditions) did 
not proceed smoothly.  From the available data it appears that for the first three 
quarters of 1993, the only criteria which has been met has been the level of 
international reserves. 
A difficult situation also prevailed in the sphere widely accepted as fiscal 
policy.  Though the official statistics of the budgetary realization (see Table 9 and 4) 
show a lower level of budget deficit in relation to GDP than in 1992, the data of 
Table 2 indirectly confirms the earlier formulated thesis that we are also dealing with 
an additional, hidden deficit.  The CBR financing of the government sector was in 
the first half of 1993 substantially higher than the official deficit. 
On the side of budgetary revenues, the key role appears to be played by three 
factors: the Supreme Council decisions from 1992 and the beginning of 1993, 
lowering the rates of the value added tax, and introducing reduced profit tax rates 
for investment (tax exemptions), the gradual decline of enterprise profitability and 
low fiscal discipline, as an effect of the political crisis (for example, part of the 
regions withheld payment of taxes to the federal budget during the first nine months 
of 1993).  From among the fiscal provisions of the STF agreement, up until 
November 1993, only the liberalization of the coal prices and the lowering of Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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subsidies to that sector has been realized, and with delay relative to the provided 
time-frame, a decision about reduction of subsidies for wheat and bread. 
Table 9: RUSSIA: CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, 1993 (% of GDP) 
Months of 1993 r.  Revenues  Expenditures  Deficit 
I-III 30.5  35.2  4.7 
I-VI 31.6  33.2  1.6 
I-IX 31.8  36.3  4.5 
Source: MFU data 
In the summer of 1993, the Supreme Council passed a budgetary bill, providing 
a budgetary deficit exceeding 20% of GDP.  This law, twice vetoed by President 
Yeltsin, was not in the end passed, due to the disolvement of parliament.  Thus 
Russia remained in 1993 without a formally approved budget. 
Also obligations of a systemic nature were only partially being realized.  A 
particular discord pertains to export regulations.  The export quotas were not 
increased, and the extent of centralized export was not limited.  In addition, the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation limited the list of exporters of the so-
called strategic raw materials (especially oil), which only increased the monopolistic 
structures in foreign trade. 
From June 1993, despite earlier stated agreements, the government and the 
CBR attempted to stabilize the exchange rate at approximately 1,000 roubles per 1 
US dollar.  As a result, the internal price structure and the relation of purchasing 
power parity were partially comparable to those of a market economy.  The role of 
competitive import increased, especially on the consumer goods market.  Russian 
stores and street stands were reminiscent of Polish ones from 1990.  However, as the 
stabilization of the exchange rate was not accompanied by a disciplined monetary 
and fiscal policy (see above), a strong real appreciation of the rouble and a decline 
of reserves occurred, beginning in August 1993.  In this situation, the government 
and the CBR were forced to withdraw from intervening  and allow a devaluation of 
the Russian currency to the level of approximately 1,200 roubles for 1 USD at the 
end of September 1993.  The political tensions related to the dissolvement of 
parliament turned out to be very significant.  Beginning in early October 1993, a 
renewed attempt at stabilizing the currency at a level of about 1,200 roubles per 1 
USD was undertaken.  In light of the persistent high inflation and an increasing 
money velocity, the perspectives for this policy are not clear.  There exists a danger 
that through this, an instrument which could be crucial in the deciding fight against 
inflation, might be discredited. 
In the situation of a less than complete realization of the agreement, rising level 
of inflation, and a deepening political crisis, the IMF has practically suspended, at 
the end of September 1993, further realization of the program of aid to Russia.  This 
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new stand-by agreement.  The experiences of 1992 were being repeated, when the 
agreement reached with the IMF on the so-called credit of the first tranche (also very 
mild) was broken by Russia right after its signing. 
With this in mind, a general reflection seems to appear - what is the sense of 
the IMF negotiating "soft" agreements, which neither guarantee the achievement of 
the sought economic results (as inflation, instead of falling, rises), nor are they 
conducive to political consolidation (as populist forces are instantly escalating their 
demands), and aside from that, are broken instantly after signing.  They are not, 
furthermore, conducive to supporting the image of the IMF as an institution, which 
above all directs itself with rigid professional prerequisites, and not current political 
tactics. 
7.3.  An attempt to accelerate reform after the October events. 
The return of Egor Gaidar to the position of first deputy Prime Minister in mid-
September 1993, and the dissolvement of the Supreme Council and the Congress of 
People's Deputies on September 21, 1993 as well as the suppression of the bloody 
communist-fascist revolt in Moscow on October 3-4, 1993, opened up new political 
possibilities for the process of economic reforms.  Their results include the decree 
on land (see point 5) as well as the limited liberalization of export (see point 4).  
Certain efforts were also undertaken in an attempt to discipline fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
The budgetary provision for the IV quarter of 1993, approved by the 
government in mid-November, anticipates a federal budget deficit of 17 trillion 
roubles for the entire year, including 5.5 billion in the IV quarter.  Part of this sum is 
to be financed through foreign credits and the issue of treasury bonds (which 
enjoyed significant interest of potential investors in the II and III quarter of 1993).  
According to the decision of Government Commission on Credit Policy dated 
October 11, 1993, an increase in the CBR credit in the IV quarter of about 6 trillion 
roubles was foreseen, which included 4 trillion roubles directly for the budget.  The 
remaining 2 billion are to be used for the centralized CBR lines of credit for specific 
branches and regions, and they are to be offered at the normal interest rates (210% 
since October 19935).  It is anticipated that the conditions surrounding the granting 
and repayment of this credit will be tightened. 
The increase of the CBR credits by 6 billion roubles represents an increase in 
the monetary base of about 40% over a quarter.  Assuming a 3 month time-lag in the 
inflationary reaction and an unvaried money velocity, an average monthly inflation 
of 13-15% should be anticipated in the I quarter of 1994.  It is the result constantly 
distant from the awaited radical break-through in anti-inflationary policy. 
                                       
5  In the case of CBR credits, there is a monthly capitalization of interest.  This means that the 
real annual yield is 539%.  It is still, however, below the level of inflation, which is maintained at a 
level of 21-22% monthly (869-987% annually). Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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The extremely slow progress of the anti-inflationary policy is limited by 
circumstances of a political nature.  From the above mentioned barriers, the socially 
non-representative and politically irresponsible parliament has been eliminated.   
Remaining, however, is the unchanged management of the CBR, as well as divisions 
inside the government, despite the return of Gaidar.  The ongoing election campaign 
to the new parliament is also not conducive to the difficult economic decisions. 
8.  The disintegration of the rouble zone 
The existence and gradual disintegration of the rouble zone has become a 
politically institutional factor significantly hindering the stabilization policy in 1992-
1993. Not entering into a detailed analysis of the history of the disintegration (a 
thorough description of this process can be found in the work of Hernandez-Cata 
[1993], D¹browski [1993], as well as Granville and Lushin [1993]), three of its phases 
can be distinguished: 
1/  The functioning, in the first half of 1993, of a monetary union de facto with 15 
independent central banks, behaving with the idea of a free ride, in other words 
attempting to mutually outbid one another in the emission of credit money.  
Particular activity in this area has been displayed by the National Bank of the 
Ukraine, which as the first on the territory of the former USSR, initiated, in June 
1992, the so-called wzaimozaciot, or the multilateral clearing of debt between 
enterprises with the help of an additional credit supply.  Russia remained a 
monopolist in the emission of cash roubles, though part of the former USSR 
republics began introducing a parallel cash currency.  This pertains to, among 
others, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Azerbajdzan. 
An extremely expansive monetary policy in certain post-soviet countries (even 
more expansive than in Russia) as well as a traditional structural imbalance in 
the interrepublic trade turnover, beneficial for Russia (in the past financed by 
immense capital transfers from the USSR budget to some of the republics [see 
Selm and Dölle, 1992]) caused a huge "import" of credit money by Russia in 
1992 and the first half of 1993. 
2/  The introduction by the CBR, at the beginning of July 1992, of the rules of 
bilateral clearing of accounts between Russia and the post-soviet countries still 
using the rouble.  The payments from these countries to Russia were realized 
only up to the sum of the given day on the correspondence account of the 
given central bank in the CBR.  This step in practice meant the end of the 
rouble as a single currency in non-cash settlements and the creation of national 
non-cash roubles.  This fundamental change in the monetary system was 
"softened" until spring of 1993, through an abundant supply of so-called 
technical credits for CIS countries from the CBR and the Russian government.  
This meant a continuation of the import of inflation by Russia from other post-
soviet countries, especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Bielorus.  In the cash 
turnover, the rouble remained a common currency, although it intensified the 
process of introducing monetary substitutes (coupons), in relation to the 
Russian rationing of the rouble bank note supply. Marek D¥BROWSKI 
CASE Foundation  Page 30 
3/  Full exit by individual post-soviet countries from the rouble zone, through the 
introduction of own national currencies.  This process was initiated at the end 
of June 1992 by Estonia, followed in the summer and fall of 1992, by Latvia, 
Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and in May 1993, the Kyrghyz republic. 
4/  The final disintegration of the rouble zone, initiated by the CBR exchange of 
rouble bank notes on the Russian territory at the end of June 1993 (see point 7).  
After a few months of political bargaining about the idea of forming the so-
called new type of rouble zone [see Granville and Lushin, 1993], all the 
remaining post-soviet countries introduced their own national currencies.  This 
occurred in the period from September to November 1993. 
The rouble zone has become history. 
9.  Summary 
In spite of a radical rhetoric and certain achievements, especially in the sphere 
of domestic liberalization and privatization, the real course of economic 
transformation in Russia is more reminiscent of gradual changes, rather than shock 
therapy.  There are more concessions and political compromises, incoherences, 
sometimes apparent changes and attempts to return to the old system etc., in other 
words all that characterized traditional reforms of the socialist economy, beginning in 
the sixties, than total and radical changes of the economic system characteristic of 
Poland and the former GDR in 1990, or Czecho-Slovakia in 1991. 
The shortcomings of the gradual approach are especially apparent in the 
sphere of foreign economic exchange, demonopolization, and above all in 
macroeconomic policy.  Despite numerous attempts, Russia has not succeeded in 
controlling inflation with the help of a gradual limitation of money supply and a 
relatively "mild" struggle with the budget deficit.  In this manner, the fall in 
production and real wages was not prevented.  Furthermore, it was the population 
which bore the brunt of the inflationary tax for sustaining ineffective enterprises. 
Everything seems to illustrate that the policy of gradual restraining of inflation 
and insignificant steps in the sphere of systemic changes ultimately exhausts its 
possibilities.  Economic history has yet to see a case where this method has been 
effective in taming high inflation.  Therefore, there is no reason for such a miracle to 
work in Russia.  Furthermore, the continuation of current policy poses the danger of 
losing all control over the macroeconomic situation and slipping into hyperinflation, 
which happened a few months ago in the Ukraine.  It is therefore time to undertake 
more radical steps which would finally stabilize the Russian economy. 
The policy of concessions and compromises has not bore the anticipated 
political fruits.  The authorities had to bear all the political costs related to the 
introduction of financial limitations (which despite all compromises had to exist), the 
fall in production, the lowering of real wages, uncontrollable stratification of 
incomes, not achieving distinct stabilizing effects, as well as a quick balancing of the 
market.  Compromises also did not prevent a dramatic political confrontation, which 
in the fall of 1993 shook the basis of a young Russian democracy.  It should be an 
important lesson for the critics of systemic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Two Years of Economic Reforms in Russia... 
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